| THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN RE-FORMATTED SO THAT IT MAY BE POSTED ON OUR INTERNET PAGES. THE CONTENT OF THIS DOCUMENT IS THE SAME AS THAT WHICH WAS FILED WITH THE COURT. IN SOME CASES, ATTACHMENTS ARE NOT INCLUDED. |
| DALE R. DEROLPH, et al., | : | Case No. 95-2066 | |
| : | |||
| Plaintiffs-Appellants, | : | On Appeal from the Court of | |
| : | Appeals for Perry County, | ||
| vs. | : | Fifth Appellate District, | |
| : | Case No. 94-CA-477 | ||
| STATE OF OHIO, et al., | : | ||
| : | |||
| Defendants-Appellees. | : | ||
| Nicholas A. Pittner (0023159) Counsel of Record John F. Birath, Jr. (0022024) Sue W. Yount (0034514) Michael D. Smith (0059870) Susan B. Greenberger (0010154) BRICKER & ECKLER LLP 100 South Third Street Columbus, Ohio 43215 Telephone: (614) 227-2300 Counsel for Appellants
| BETTY D. MONTGOMERY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO
Jeffrey S. Sutton (0051226) |
| Robert B. McAlister (0023108) Elizabeth A. McNellie (0046534) BAKER & HOSTETLER 65 East State Street, Suite 2100 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Telephone: (614) 228-1541
Special Counsel for Appellee
| Lawrence A. Kane, Jr. (0012711) Mark A. VanderLaan (0013297) Joel S. Taylor (0019572) David K. Mullen (0046857) William M. Mattes (0040465) DINSMORE & SHOHL 175 South Third Street, Suite 1000 Columbus, Ohio 43215 Telephone: (614) 224-7887
Special Counsel for Appellees |
| Page | |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS | i |
| TABLE OF AUTHORITIES | xi |
| INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| STATEMENT OF FACTS | 2 |
| 3 |
| 4 |
| 7 |
| 9 |
| 12 |
| 12 |
| 14 |
| 17 |
| 20 |
| ARGUMENT | 23 |
| 23 |
| 23 |
| 25 |
| 24 |
| 30 |
| 30 |
| 31 |
| 31 |
| 32 |
| 32 |
| 33 |
| 34 |
| 34 |
| 34 |
| 35 |
| 35 |
| 35 |
| 36 |
| 38 |
| 39 |
| 39 |
| 40 |
| 37 |
| 38 |
| 43 |
| 43 |
| 41 |
| 45 |
| 42 |
| 45 |
| 45 |
| 46 |
| 42 |
| 46 |
| 42 |
| 42 |
| 43 |
| 46 |
| 47 |
| 47 |
| 47 |
| 47 |
| 48 |
| 49 |
| 51 |
| 51 |
| 52 |
| 52 |
| 53 |
| 55 |
| 56 |
| 57 |
| 54 |
| 56 |
| 56 |
| 63 |
| 64 |
| 58 |
| 64 |
| 66 |
| 66 |
| 66 |
| 66 |
| 67 |
| 61 |
| 68 |
| 68 |
| 68 |
| 68 |
| 69 |
| 63 |
| 69 |
| 70 |
| 70 |
| 71 |
| 62, 64 |
| 72 |
| 72 |
| 73 |
| 73 |
| 74 |
| 74 |
| 68 |
| 76 |
| 76 |
| 77 |
| 77 |
| 71 |
| 79 |
| 79 |
| 79 |
| 79 |
| 80 |
| 72 |
| 81 |
| 82 |
| 82 |
| CONCLUSION | 74 |
| CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | 76 |
| APPENDIX | |
| 1. Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order & Memorandum | 1 |
| 2. Notice of Appeal of Appellants Dale R. DeRolph, et al. | 479 |
| 3. Opinion of the Fifth Appellate District Court | 482 |
| 4. Article I of the Ohio Constitution | 522 |
| 522 |
| 522 |
| 522 |
| 522 |
| 5. Article II of the Ohio Constitution | 523 |
| 523 |
| 6. Article VI of the Ohio Constitution | 524 |
| 524 |
| 525 |
| 7. Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution | 526 |
| 526 |
| 526 |
| 8. Article XII of the Ohio Constitution | 527 |
| 527 |
| 9. Title 20 of the United States Code | 528 |
| 528 |
| 529 |
| 531 |
| 532 |
| 532 |
| 10. Ohio School Funding Statutes | 533 |
| 533 |
| 533 |
| 534 |
| 535 |
| 535 |
| 536 |
| 537 |
| 538 |
| 541 |
| 541 |
| 542 |
| 543 |
| 544 |
| 11 Portion of Am. Sub. H.B. 117 (Biennial Operating Appropriations FY95/FY97) | 546 |
| 12. R.C. Chapter 133 Uniform Public Securities Law: Debt Limitation | 551 |
| 551 |
| 554 |
| 13. R.C. Chapter 319 Auditor: Real and Personal Property Taxes 556 | |
| 556 |
| 14. R.C. Chapter 3301 Department of Education | 558 |
| 558 |
| 559 |
| 561 |
| 564 |
| 565 |
| 569 | |
| 571 |
| 572 |
| 15. R.C. Chapter 3302 Education Standards | 573 |
| 573 |
| 573 |
| 574 |
| 574 |
| 576 |
| 16. R.C. Chapter 3313 Boards of Education | 589 |
| 578 |
| 581 |
| 583 |
| 583 |
| 585 |
| 585 |
| 586 |
| 587 |
| 588 |
| 589 |
| 591 |
| 592 |
| 594 |
| 17. R.C. Chapter 3317 Foundation Program | 596 |
| 596 |
| 18. R.C. Chapter 3323 Education of Handicapped Children | 598 |
| 598 |
| 600 |
| 601 |
| 602 |
| 603 |
| 603 |
| 19. R.C. Chapter 4117 Public Employees' Collective Bargaining | 604 |
| 604 |
| 20. R.C. Chapter 5705 Tax Levy Law | 605 |
| 605 |
| 605 |
| 21. OAC 3301 Department of Education (Index only) | 607 |
| 22. OAC 3301-35 - Ohio Department of Education's 1983 Minimum Standards | 610 |
| 23. Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, 19 IDELR 810, March 31, 1993 (pp. 810, 814-15, 827-28, 831, 836-37, 839) | 635 |
| 24. Thompson, et al. v. State of Ohio, et al., United States District Court Southern District of Ohio, E.D., No. C-2-91-464, Memorandum and Order Regarding Motion for Summary Judgment, filed Oct. 6, 1993 | 644 |
| 25 Reed, et al. v. Rhodes, et al., United States District Court Northern District of Ohio, E.D., No. 1:73CV1300, Order Requiring the State to Take Over the Finances of the Cleveland City School District, filed Mar. 3, 1995 | 677 |
| 26. Raymond H. v. Illinois State Board of Education, (July 30, 1992), United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D., No. 91-C-6794, unreported, 1992 WL 186248 | 686 |
| Page | |
| Abbot v. Burke (N.J. 1990), 575 A.2d 359, 403 | 37, 66 |
| Adamsky v. Buckeye Local School Dist. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 360, 362, 653 N.E.2d 212, 214 | 47, 56 |
| Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt (1993), 19 IDELR 810, 839 | 43, 58, 69 |
| American Motors Corp. v. Huffstutler (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 343, 575 N.E.2d 116 | 69 |
| Arnett v. Kennedy (1974), 416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 | 42 |
| Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 44 | 50, 51, 52, 53 |
| Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 390 N.E.2d | passim |
| Beifuss v. Westerville Bd. of Edn. (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 187, 189, 525 N.E.2d 20, 23 | 34 |
| Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. 186, 191, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2844, 92 L.Ed.2d 140, 146 | 61 |
| Bradley v. Milliken (1976), 540 F.2d 229, 245 | 69 |
| Brown v. Bd. of Edn. of Topeka (1956), 347 U.S. 483, 492-493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 691, 98 L.Ed. 873, 880 | 29, 51, 68 |
| Campbell County Local School Dist. v. State of Wyoming (Wyo. 1995), 907 P.2d 1238, 1270 | 34, 37, 40, 60, 66 |
| Chew v. Gates et al. (C.A. 9, 1994), 27 F.3d 1432, 1464 | 51 |
| City of Cincinnati v. Trustees of Cincinnati Hospital (1902), 66 Ohio St. 440, 450, 64 N.E. 420, 423 | 67 |
| City of Cleveland ex rel. Neelon v. Locher (1971), 25 Ohio St.2d 49, 52, 266 N.E.2d 831, 834 | 66, 68 |
| City of Rocky River v. SERB (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 539 N.E.2d 103 | 31 |
| Cleveland Bd. of Edn. v. Loudermill (1985), 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.E.2d 494 | 42 |
| Debra P. v. Turlington (C.A. 5 1981), 644 F.2d 397, 404 | 43 |
| Dennis v. Chang (C.A. 9, 1980), 611 F.2d 1302, 1306-7 | 73 |
| DuPree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30 (Ark. 1983), 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. Const. XIV, Section 1) | 37, 59 |
| Edgewood Independent School Dist. v. Kirby (Tx. 1989), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tx. Const. Art VII, Section 1) | 37, 151 |
| Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Edn. (C.A. 7 1987), 811 F.2d 1030 | 38, 34, 67 |
| Goss v. Lopez (1975), 419 U.S. 565, 573-574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 735-736, 42 L.Ed.2d 725, 734 | 43 |
| Grinsted v. Houston County School District (M.D. Georgia 1993), 826 F.Supp. 482, 485 | 44 |
| Harris v. Champion (1994), 15 F.3d 1538, 1562 (C.A. 10) | 69 |
| Hewitt v. Helms (1983), 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 | 43 |
| Honig v. Doe (1988), 484 U.S. 305, 329, 108 S.Ct. 592, 607, 98 L.Ed.2d 686, 710 | 44 |
| Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1983), 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 275, 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1319 | 73 |
| Illinois Controls, Inc. v. Langham (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 512, paragraph six of the syllabus, 639 N.E.2d 771, 774 | 64, 65 |
| Invisible Empire Knights of KKK v. City of W. Haven (D. Conn. 1985), 600 F.Supp. 1427, 1434 | 35, 44 |
| K.P. v. Juswic (1995), 891 F.Supp. 703, 713 | 35, 44 |
| Lopez v. Williams (S.D. Ohio 1973) 372 F.Supp. 1279 1293 | 34 |
| Marbury v. Madison (1803), 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 | 6742 |
| Miller v. Korns (1923), 107 Ohio St. 287, 304, 140 N.E. 773, 778 | passim |
| Moore v. East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1938, 52 L.Ed.2d 531, 540 | 51, 69 |
| Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brandenburg (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 157, 160, 648 N.E.2d 488, 490 | 71, 72 |
| Nicoletti v. Brown (N.D. Ohio 1987), 740 F.Supp. 1268, 1286-1287 | 42 |
| Ohio State Chiropractic Assn. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers' Comp. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 485, 650 N.E.2d 1359 | 72 |
| Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education (W.D.MI. 1971), 346 F.Supp. 766, 770 | 51 |
| Palko v. Connecticut (1937), 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.E. 288, 292 | 51 |
| Pauley v. Kelley (W.Va. 1979), 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 | 37, 51 |
| Payne v. Tennessee (1991), 501 U.S. 808, 828, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609-2610, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, 737 | 31, 32 |
| Peerless Electric Co. v. Bowers (1955), 164 Ohio St. 209, 129 N.E.2d 467 | 31 |
| Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Edn. (S.D. Ohio 1977), 429 F.Supp. 229, 262, affirmed in part | 34, 51 |
| Perkins v. Northeastern Log Homes (Ky. 1991), 808 S.W.2d 809, 817 | 51 |
| Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 256, 41 L.Ed. 256 | 29 |
| Racing Guild of Ohio v. Ohio State Racing Commission (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 317, 503 N.E.2d 1025 | 72 |
| Ramon H. v. Illinois State Bd. of Edn. (N.D. 111 1992), 1192 WL 186248 | 44 |
| Reed v. Rhodes (C.A. 6, 1979), 607 F.2d 714 | 51 |
| Reed v. Rhodes (March 3, 1995) N.D. Ohio , E.Div., No. 1:73CV1300, unreported | 41, 58 |
| Roosevelt Elementary School Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop (Ariz. 1994), 179 Ariz. 233 240, 877 P.2d 806, 813 | 34, 40 |
| Rose v. Counsel for Better Edn. (Ky. 1989), 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. Const. Section 183) | 37, 66, 67 |
| San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 25, 93 S.Ct. 1279, 1292, 36 L.Ed 16, 38 | 37 |
| Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall (N.Y. App. 1985), 66 N.Y. 2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211 | 51 |
| Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) 394 U.S. 618, 633, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1330, 22 L.Ed.2d 600, 614 | 69 |
| Shaw v. Allen (S.D.W.Va. 199), 771 F.Supp. 760, 763 | 69 |
| Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415, 423, 633 N.E.2d 504, 510 | 47 |
| State ex rel. Evans v. Bainbridge Twp. Trustees (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 41, 448 N.E.2d 1159 | 65 |
| State ex rel. Fairfield Leader v. Ricketts (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 97, 104, 564 N.E.2d 486, 493 | 73 |
| State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes (1952), 158 Ohio St. 129, 131, 107 N.E.2d 206, 208 | 64 |
| State ex rel. Kitchen v. Christman (1972), 31 Ohio St.2d 64, 285 N.E.2d 362 | 63 |
| State ex rel. Multimedia, Inc. v. Whalen (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 99, 101, 554 N.E.2d 1321, 1323 | 73 |
| State ex rel. Nagle v. Olin 64 Ohio St.2d 341, 352 n.15, 510 n.15, 415 N.E.2d 279, 287 n.15 | 51 |
| State ex rel. Ohio Funds Management Board v. Walker 564 N.E.2d 502 (1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 1,7, 461 N.E.2d 279, 287 n.15 | 62, 63, 64 |
| State ex rel. Scott v. Masterson (1962) 173 Ohio St.402, 405, 183 N.E.2d 376, 379 | 69 |
| State ex rel. Shkurti v. Withrow (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 424, 513 N.E.2d 1332 | 63 |
| State ex rel. Tavenner v. Indian Lake Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 88, 90, 578 N.E.2d 464 | 31, 34 |
| State v. McDermot (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 570, 651 N.E.2d 985 | 24 |
| State v. Medbery (1857), 7 Ohio st. 522 | 64 |
| Straube v. Florida Union Free School Dist. (S.D.N.Y. 1992), 801 F.Supp. 1164, 1172 | 44 |
| Todaro v. Ward (C.A.2, 1977), 565 F.2d 48, 54 n.8 | 69 |
| Valerie J. v. Derry Co-op School District (D.N.H. 1991), 771 F.Supp. 483 | 44 |
| Verberg v. Bd. of Edn. of the City School Dist. of Cleveland (1939), 1135 Ohio St. 246, 20 N.E.2d 368 | 34 |
| Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No.1 (1982), 458 U.S. 457, 487, n.31, 102 S.Ct. 3187, 3203 n.31, 73 L.Ed.2d 896, 918 n.31 | 73 |
| Williamson Heater Co. v. Radich (1934), 128 Ohio St. 124, 190 N.E. 403, (syllabus) | 24 |
| Winkler v. School Bldg. Auth. (W.Va. 1993), 189 W.Va. 748, 434 S.E.2d 420 | 63 |
| Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397 | 32 |
| Constitutional Provisions | |
| Section 1, Article I | 30, 46 |
| Section 2, Article I | 1, 24, 46, 47 |
| Section 7, Article I | 1, 33, 68 |
| Section 16, Article I | 43 |
| Section 26, Article II | 1, 46 |
| Section 2, Article VI | 1, 24, 32, 36, 42, 49, 50, 68 |
| Section 3, Article VI | 1, 33, 49 |
| Section 4, Article VI | 49 |
| Section 1, Article VII | 1 |
| Section 3, Article VII | 1 |
| Article VIII, Ohio Constitution | 62, 63, 64, 65 |
| Section 1, Article VIII | 28, 60, 61, 63, 65 |
| Section 2, Article VIII | 61, 63 |
| Section 3, Article VIII | 28, 60, 61, 64, 65 |
| Article XII, Ohio Constitution | 62, 64, 65 |
| Section 4, Article XII | 1, 28, 60, 61, 64, 65 |
| Section 5, Article XII | 3 |
| Statutes | |
| 20 U.S.C. § 1221-1 | 52 |
| 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. | 34, 43 |
| 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) | 67 |
| 20 U.S.C. § 3401 | 52 |
| 20 U.S.C. § 6301 | 52 |
| Section 1415(e)(2), Title 20, U.S. Code | 71 |
| Section 1415, Title 20, U.S. Code | 71 |
| R.C. Chapter 2721 | 71, 72, 73 |
| R.C. Chapter 3318 | 18 |
| R.C. Chapter 3323 | 13, 43 |
| R.C. 133.301 | 61 |
| R.C. 2335.39 | 71 |
| R.C. 2721.01 to 2721.15, inclusive | 72 |
| R.C. 2721.09 | 72 |
| R.C. 2721.11 | 72 |
| R.C. 2721.13 | 72 |
| R.C. 2743.19 | 71 |
| R.C. 3301.07 | 27 |
| R.C. 3301.07(D) | 9, 42 |
| R.C. 3301.0710 | 10 |
| R.C. 3301.0716 | 16 |
| R.C. 3307.53 | 13 |
| R.C. 3313.4810 | 58 |
| R.C. 3313.483 | 20, 61 |
| R.C. 3313.483(E)(3) | 64 |
| R.C. 3313.488 | 58 |
| R.C. 3317.02 | 24 |
| R.C. 3317.022 | 24 |
| R.C. 3317.023 | 14 |
| R.C. 3317.023[A] | 24 |
| R.C. 3317.53 | 25 |
| R.C. 3317.53[A] | 24 |
| R.C. 3321.03 | 42 |
| R.C. 3323.02 | 44 |
| R.C. 3323.05 | 71 |
| Rules | |
| Civ.R. 8(A) | 64 |
| Rule 1(B) of the Ohio Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions | 24 |
| Regulations | |
| 34 C.F.R. § 300.600 (West, 1993) | 44 |
| Ohio Adm. Code 3301-35 | 9, 11 |
| Ohio Adm. Code 3301-51-04(G)(3) | 45 |
| Ohio Adm. Code 3301-51 | 44 |
| Miscellaneous | |
| Baldwin's Revised Code Annotated (1990) | 50 |
| Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution | 37 |
| Hawk, "As Perfect As Can Be Devised: DeRolph v. State of Ohio and the Right to Education in Ohio (1995), 45 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 679 | 48 |
| Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Ohio (Columbus: F.J. Heer Printing Co., 1912), at 869 | 49 |
| Northwest Ordinance of 1787 | 49 |
| 36, 48 | |
| Section 30, Am. Sub. S.B. 221 | 24, 25 |
(Findings at 474-75)
(Findings at 473-74)
(Tr. 1293; Findings at 185)[57] Unfortunately, as shown by the uncontradicted evidence in this case, Southern Local's experience with deteriorating school buildings is not unique.[58]
(Franklin Depo. 33, 239; Supp. 940, 975; Findings at 160)[61] Immediate health dangers to Plaintiffs and children in other school districts are caused by the presence of asbestos, coal dust, extreme heat and cold, and inadequate wiring, windows, and roofs. Further, Plaintiff Districts and all other school districts must comply with the mandates of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).[62] Although these dangers and needs have been recognized by the State, and some meager funds were made available by the State to a few school districts in the past for asbestos abatement and removal of architectural barriers, no more such aid is forthcoming.[63] (Findings at 161-167) Further, the State has appropriated no funds for emergency building problems and no funds specifically for building maintenance.
(Tr. 2544-2545; Findings at 167)
I. Proposition of Law No. I: This constitutional
challenge to the current system of public school funding is distinct from
that in Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 368,
390 N.E.2d 813, because the challenged funding statutes, the operation
of those statutes, and the educational needs of Ohio's public
school pupils are significantly different from those before this
Court in that case.
The importance of education, and the characteristics of a constitutionally-adequate
education, were no more fixed for all time by Walter than they
were by Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct.
256, 41 L.Ed. 256. Just as the Supreme Court in Brown reflected
on the evolving significance of education, so it is appropriate
that this Court recognize that a "high quality" education
within the meaning of Walter must be measured in terms
of contemporary needs.[82]
(Findings at 468-69)[83] After thorough analysis, the Trial Court
correctly held that Walter's review of a different funding
system, as it existed almost two decades ago, does not compel
a conclusion of constitutionality here. The Court of Appeals erred
in failing to uphold the Trial Court's thoughtful and proper conclusions.
Id. at 6-7, 539 N.E.2d at 108.
II. Proposition of Law No. II: The current system of
public school funding fails to satisfy the State's duty to provide
a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout Ohio
as required by the Ohio Constitution, and additionally violates
the Due Process and other clauses of the Constitution.
(Emphasis added.)[87] According to this Court: "This declaration
calls for the upbuilding of a system of schools throughout the
state, and the attainment of efficiency and thoroughness in that
system is thus expressly made a purpose, not local, not municipal,
but state-wide." Miller v. Korns, 107 Ohio St. at
297, 140 N.E. at 776. The duty to upbuild
this system expressly is assigned to the General Assembly both
by the constitutional provision quoted above, and by Section 7,
Article I, Ohio Constitution, which
provides: "Religion, morality, and knowledge, however, being
essential to good government, it shall be the duty of the
general assembly to pass suitable laws *** to encourage schools
and the means of instruction." (emphasis added.)
Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Edn. (S.D. Ohio 1977), 429 F.Supp.
229, 262, affirmed in part, remanded in
part (C.A. 6, 1978), 583 F.2d 787, stay granted (1978), 99 S.Ct.
24, 439 U.S. 1348, 58 L.Ed.2d 55, stay vacated (1978), 99 S.Ct.
3107, 443 U.S. 916, 61 L.Ed.2d 879, certiorari granted 99 (1978),
S.Ct. 831, 439 U.S. 1066, 59 L.Ed.2d 31, affirmed (1979), 99 S.Ct.
2941, 443 U.S. 449, 61 L.Ed.2d 666, rehearing denied (1979), 100
S.Ct. 186, 444 U.S. 887, 62 L.Ed.2d 121, on remand (S.D. Ohio
1981), 519 F.Supp. 925.[90] It is self-evident that the legislature
cannot delegate authority it does not possess, and any suggestion
that the State can empower local districts to violate the constitutional
entitlements of school children is without legal support.
Indeed, this Court has described a scenario where a school funding
system would not satisfy the thorough and efficient clause:
Miller v. Korns, 107 Ohio St. at 298, 140 N.E. at 776.
The record of this action is replete with evidence that the Plaintiff
school districts are starve for funds and lack teachers, buildings,
and equipment.[96]
(Findings at 175-83) In each of these instances the District sought
assistance from the State. In each instance the State refused,
and failed to offer any financial assistance; it was left to the
District to allocate precious dollars to address these problems,
at the expense of other student needs. Id. Once again,
State inaction invites the question of whether any system that
places such a burden on local school districts, at the risk of
physical harm to students, can be either "thorough or efficient."
Courts consistently have held that constitutionally protected
property rights are created not only by constitutions but also
by the nature and extent of legislative and regulatory recognition
of those rights.[108] Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio
Constitution unequivocally states that the Ohio General Assembly
shall provide a thorough and efficient school system
for the children of the State. The General Assembly has chosen
to carry out its constitutional duty by empowering the State Board
of Education to "[f]ormulate and prescribe minimum standards
to be applied to all elementary and secondary schools in this
state for the purpose of requiring a general education of high
quality." R.C. 3301.07(D). Ohio requires
that all school-aged pupils, under penalty of law, attend either
a public school or a school meeting minimum standards prescribed
by the State Board of Education. R.C. 3321.03. Taken
together, these laws create on behalf of the children of this
state an absolute property and liberty interest in education,
and an affirmative duty on the part of the State to provide such
education in a through and efficient manner. The rights thus created
are common to all of Ohio's children, regardless of where they
may happen to reside.
Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d at 404. (citations omitted).
b. each public school district provides an appropriate program
of special education and related services to each eligible pupil
enrolled in the school district.
(Stip. 57)[111]
III. Proposition of Law No. III: Public education is
a fundamental right guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution, and the
rights of public school children to equal protection of law are
violated by Ohio's system of funding public education because
this system arbitrarily discriminates in the quality of education
that it provides to children; even if public education were not
a fundamental right, the wealth-based discrimination in which
the State engages violates the Constitution because such discrimination
is not rationally related to any legitimate state objective.
"Shall we *** constitute a class who will become the inmates
of our poor houses, and the tenants of our jails? I think it must
be clear to every reflecting mind that the true policy of the
statesman is to provide the means of education, and consequent
moral improvement, to every child in the State, the offspring
of the black man equally with that of the white man, the children
of the poor equally with the rich."
Inherent in the Ohio Constitution's use of the phrase "system
of common schools" is the requirement that the public schools
of Ohio educate all students, rich or poor, at similar levels,
and provide them with similar opportunities.[125]
Miller v. Korns, 107 Ohio State at 306. More recently the long-held convictions of this Court have been mirrored in legislative findings regarding the fundamentality
of education expressed by the Congress of the United States.[129] The
education rights now recognized by Congress as fundamental have
long been guaranteed to every Ohioan by our State Constitution.[130]
"And when the state gives three shares of knowledge to a
child in a wealthy part of the state and one share to a child
in another part of the state, it owes a special reason to the
people of Ohio. When the legislature malapportions its resources
in order to deny knowledge, deny educational opportunity, then
it owes a special reason."
Miller v. Korns, 107 Ohio St. at 298, 140 N.E. at 776.
Id. at 303, 140 N.E. at 777-778. The State has turned the
logic of this Court on its head, allocating the most to those
with the least needs, and inflicting deprivation upon those whose
needs are greatest. In the process, the State would have the courts
contribute to the polarization that threatens the fabric of our
society.
(Findings at 469-470) Plaintiff districts cannot "develop
programs to meet perceived local needs," as Walter envisioned,
and the Trial Court correctly concluded that in Ohio local control
of education is a "cruel illusion." (Findings at 469-470)
Bd. of Edn. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d at 380, 390 N.E.2d
at 821; Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30 (Ark.1983),
279 Ark. 340, 346, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93.
Findings at 469-70.[141]
IV. Proposition of Law No. IV: The current system of
public school funding violates limitations on deficit spending
expressed in Sections 1 and 3, Article VIII, and Section 4, Article
XII of the Ohio Constitution by legislatively requiring school
districts to engage in borrowing on a massive scale in order to
finance the provision of educational services for which the State
is responsible.
Illinois Controls, Inc. v. Langham (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 512, paragraph six of the syllabus, 639 N.E.2d 771, 774 . The school loan programs, as integral components
of the larger school funding system, always have been central
to the claims litigated in this suit and have been clearly disclosed
from the outset.[148] Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to prevail
on any legal theory supportive of their claims.
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Swan analyzed Section 4 Article
XII of the Ohio Constitution, which provides for raising sufficient
revenue to defray the expenses of the state for each year[.]***According
to Judge Swan, the General Assembly is free in its discretion
to expend funds as it deems appropriate; however, the Constitution
requires that the General Assembly also provide revenue to pay
all expenses and claims within the biennium.
Ohio Funds Mgt. Bd.(1990), 55 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 561 N.E.2d 927,
930-931 (citing State v. Medbury, 7 Ohio St. at 540)[149]
V. Proposition of Law No. V: When the State deprives
economically and politically unempowered children of their constitutional
entitlement to a thorough, efficient and equitable public education,
it is appropriate and necessary that (1) the judiciary retain
continuing jurisdiction to ensure implementation of a constitutional
system of public education; and (2) Plaintiff-Appellants be awarded
attorney fees to compensate them for the costs of bringing suit
to compel the State to do that which the Ohio Constitution commands.
City of Cincinnati v. Trustees of Cincinnati Hospital (1902),
66 Ohio St. 440, 450, 64 N.E. 420, 423. This
Court eloquently inveighed against the sort of deference to the
legislature exemplified by the opinion of the Court of Appeals
in the instant case.
Id. at 452-3, 64 N.E. at 424. The consequences of the instant
case are great, the political attention engendered is substantial,
and the appeal of "compromise or concession" is apparent.
Far from justifying deference to the political process, however,
these are the very reasons why it is imperative that the judiciary
intervene to protect the constitutional entitlements of those
who are without a voice in that process: the unenfranchised children
of Ohio.[152]
City of Cleveland ex rel. Neelon v. Locher (1971), 25 Ohio
St.2d 49, paragraph one of the syllabus, 266 N.E.2d 831,832.[153] The
State has a constitutional duty that it no longer can be permitted
to neglect--a duty to provide the children of Ohio with an education
that will enable them, and all of Ohio, to move productively into
the next millennium.
Brown v. Board of Education (1955), 349 U.S. 294, 300-301,
74 S.Ct. 693, 756-757, 99 L.Ed. 884, 1106. [154]
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brandenburg, 72 Ohio St.3d at
160, 648 N.E.2d at 490.[160]
Respectfully submitted,
_______________________________
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellants
1. Sections 2 and 3 of Article VI and Section 7 of Article I establish the duty of the State to provide for a thorough and efficient system of public education; Section 4 of Article XII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article VII also require the State to fund that system and Sections 2 and 7 of Article I and Section 26 of Article II establish the Plaintiffs' rights to relief based on the State's failure to fulfill its constitutional obligation.
2. Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution (emphasis added).
3. The Trial Court's "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Memorandum and Order" is included in volume I of the Appendix to Appellants' Brief (referenced hereafter as "Findings"). The State does not dispute the Findings of Fact issued by the Trial Court and cited herein. In fact, the State has admitted time and again that the current funding system is obsolete and in need of reform. (Tr. 348-349; Findings at 27).
4. Section 5 of Article XII of the Ohio Constitution prohibits taxation except as permitted by state law. All school district tax revenues are levied pursuant to state law and thus are "state" revenues.
5. The operation of the school foundation program is described in Pl. Exh. 399; Supp. 312-327. Local school district property taxes are levied in mills per dollar of taxable property valuation; thus, the greater the value of taxable property within a school district, the greater the amount of revenue per mill of tax. References herein to "rich" school districts refer to those having relatively greater valuation of taxable property per pupil than their "poor" counterparts. A more detailed description of the operation of the school funding system is found in the Plaintiff-Appellees' Brief to the Court of Appeals at pages 6-27 as well as the Supplement at tab V and Pl. Exh. 344.
6. Thus, for FY91 alone, a classroom of 25 students at Beachwood would have $205,100 more than a classroom of 25 students at Northern Local. With this level of disparity, a child residing in the Beachwood Schools would receive 13 years of public education at an approximate cost of $148,317, while a child residing in the Plaintiff Northern Local Schools would receive 12.5 years of public education at an approximate cost of $40,063. (Beachwood provides all-day kindergarten (Tr. 2503; Findings at 435), but Northern provides only every other day kindergarten (Tr. 1471; Findings at 376).)
7. (Pl. Exh. 3; Stip. Exh. 4; Pl. Exh. 270) The two districts have about the same number of pupils.
8. A tax levy in excess of ten mills has very little chance of passing, except in dire circumstances. (Findings at 62)
9. More than 275 school districts would need to levy over 10 mills, nearly 100 districts would need to levy over 20 mills, and Plaintiff Dawson-Bryant Local Schools would need to levy 33.65 mills just to bring per pupil expenditures up to the state average. (Pl. Exh. 381)
10. Specifically, in 1980, the bottom 200 school districts--ranked by income of residents--had more non-residential (business) property value than did the top 200 school districts, but by 1990, the location of business property shifted and the wealthy 200 districts had more business property. (Tr. 1073; Pl. Exh. 100; Supp. 369, 389)
11. As explained by Dr. Tod Porter, an economist at Youngstown State University, the decade saw a shift in the types of commercial value away from heavy industry and toward commercial value such as shopping malls which tend to be located in areas proximate to high income residents. (Tr. 1070-73; Supp. 367-369)
12. The equal yield system was challenged in Bd. of Edn. v. Walter (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d. 368, 390 N.E.2d 813.
13. Former Senator Oliver Ocasek, one of the drafters of the equal yield formula, testified that the 1976 legislation was intended not only to provide a greater degree of equity in school funding but also to reduce the instability that results from the biennial budget process. The potential benefits of the equal yield system were never realized. (Tr. 2822-23; Findings at 34)
14. Though initially effective on October 11, 1976, H.B. 920 has been amended numerous times since its initial passage. Significant here is the addition of a twenty mill "floor" of tax reductions in 1977 and the change from one to two classes of property for tax reduction purposes in 1981. At the time of trial, more than 200 of Ohio's 611 school districts had reached the 20 mill floor of tax reductions with respect to one or both classes of real property. (Findings at 83) Many of the school districts levying local school taxes at the 20 mill floor are among the more wealthy school districts in Ohio. For FY90 alone, the amount of reduction in taxes that would have been levied is $1.176 billion. (Tr. 81; Findings at 55) In FY92, Ohio school districts lost a total of $1.472 billion due to the application of tax reduction factors. (Tr. 321; Findings at 56)
15. An in-depth analysis of the operation of H.B. 920 as communicated from then State Superintendent Sanders to Governor Voinovich is included at Supp. 446. The interaction of tax rate reductions resulting from H.B. 920 and the operation of the school foundation formula produce results that defy logic. One example, characterized as "phantom revenue" is a situation in which a school district receives an increase in the valuation of its taxable real property, realizes little or no increase in "local" revenues from the increase, and yet, experiences a loss in school foundation payments. (Tr. 98-99; Findings at 44, 58) Similarly, the operation of the "20 mill floor" of reductions operates to benefit some school districts (primarily wealthy districts) by permitting those school districts that have reached the "floor" of reductions to benefit from inflationary growth in the value of taxable real property, while those that are not at the "floor" receive no growth in revenue and may, as noted above, actually lose revenue as the result of growth in value. (Id.; Tr. 75-76; Findings at 58) These inexplicable results of the operation of the State's funding system caused the Trial Court to observe, "The combination of the 20 mill floor and the effects of the 'phantom revenue' result in an arbitrary distribution of the State's wealth and does not serve a 'legitimate state interest.'" (Findings at 475)
16. Dr. Howard Fleeter, a professor at The Ohio State University, was commissioned by the Governor's Education Management Council to study Ohio's system of school funding. His extensive report is Pl. Exh. 344, Supp. 498-520.
17. (Russell Depo. at 90; Tavakolian Depo. at 142; Tr. 1725-26, 4161, 4525-26)
18. Final Report of the Joint Select Committee to study Ohio's school foundation program and the distribution of state funds to school districts, Jan. 1991(emphasis added). (Pl. Exh. 182, p. 6; Supp. 567)
19. (Tr. 4525-26; Findings at 27)
20. Defendant State Superintendent of Public Instruction, following the release of the FY94 and FY95 budget from the legislature, wrote: "We were not able to secure a level of funding sufficient to cover even the ongoing cost of current operations for all of our school districts." (Pl. Exh. 31)
21. This fact is labeled as a "weakness" in the funding system by the Defendant State Board of Education. The other 5 weaknesses in the funding system admitted by the State Board include:
22. Dr. Howard Fleeter stated "increases in state assistance and changes in state distribution formulas have not kept pace with increases in property wealth inequities across the districts of most states. Ohio's recent history is a good example of this phenomenon." (Pl. Exh. 344, p. 11; Supp. 502)
23. (Russell Depo. 52; Tavakolian Depo. 50; Tr. 138, 4174-75; Pl. Exh. 182, p. 6; Findings at 36)
24. Medicaid grew at about the same rate. (Tr. 4377; Findings at 35) Medicaid has grown from 19% of the state's budget to nearly 33% of the state's budget in the last 12 years. (Tr. 4377)
25. (Tr. 4392-96; Supp. 4392) The foundation formula's basic aid increased only 1.9% (from $2817 to $2871) from FY93 to FY94. (Stip. Exh. 11)
26. (Schiraldi Depo. 65-66; Findings at 284) These requirements included such things as quality of lighting, facilities for science with adequate and safe chemical storage, numbers of books in libraries based on enrollment, and dates of textbooks and encyclopedias. Textbooks with copyright dates of over 5 years required attention. (See Pl. Exh. 411 (elementary standards); Pl. Exh. 410 (junior high standards); and Pl. Exh. 409 (high school standards)). These standards were in effect at the time of Walter.
27. (Tr. 288-90; Findings at 289; Supp. 289-92) Both Superintendent Sanders and the State Board of Education have declared that the 1983 minimum standards and evaluation process are "antiquated." Dr. Sanders wrote to Governor Voinovich: "You know from our earlier conversations that I share your concerns about the potential 'fall out' from large numbers of the Class of 1994 not passing the ninth grade proficiency test. This was one reason I chose to abandon the antiquated school evaluation process and deploy staff to assist districts with large numbers of students failing the proficiency tests. You should know that we are showing improvements, but they are not coming fast enough to avoid a crisis in 1994." (Emphasis added.) (Pl. Exh. 29)
28. In 1987, Ohio Law required development of proficiency tests for the 9th and 12th grades. The statutory purpose of the 9th grade proficiency test is to ensure "that students who receive a high school diploma demonstrate at least ninth grade levels of literacy and basic competency in reading, writing, mathematics, science and citizenship." R.C. 3301.0710 (emphasis added). Effective for the 1993-94 school year, a student who passed all curricula requirements but not the 9th grade proficiency test would not receive a diploma. (Stip. 111) At time of trial (October 1993), approximately 17,000 Ohio high school seniors had not yet passed all four parts of the 9th grade proficiency test (the science part had not yet been added) after at least six opportunities to take the test. (Tr. 394-95; Findings at 300) The rate of high school drop outs was expected to increase as students continued to fail the 9th grade proficiency test. (Findings at 300) Not only do pupils in poor school districts tend to do poorly on the 9th grade proficiency test, they lag behind in other measures such as graduation rates, increased drop out rates, and participation in higher education. (Findings at 310-320)
29. Dr. Sanders' news release stated: "'We can no longer allow a situation where schools can meet all of the state's minimum standards but have students failing to meet academic requirements that society expects,' said Sanders. 'This is a turning point for education in Ohio.' 'Rather than focus on whether schools are meeting the state's minimum standards, we will turn our attention to establishing standards that determine what students should know and be able to do upon graduation,' Sanders added." (Pl. Exh. 24; Supp. 1156, Tab X. Minimum Standards))
30. Plaintiff school districts were last reviewed for "compliance" with the 1983 minimum standards prior to December 1988 for Northern Local, February 1989 for Lima City, June 1989 for Southern Local, February 1990 for Youngstown City, and June 1991 for Dawson-Bryant. Though advised of "compliance" as of each of those dates, the actual reviews occurred much earlier. Thus, children in the Plaintiff school districts have progressed through substantial portions of their public school careers without the benefit of even a cursory review for minimum standards compliance. (Stip. 99; Findings at 290)
31. A 1993 statewide technology study, commissioned by the General Assembly, concluded that poor school districts have less access to virtually all aspects of technology than the more wealthy. (Findings at 271-272; Pl. Exh. 34) Not only do the Plaintiffs and other poor school districts have less technology to begin with, what they do have is often obsolete. The stark contrast in access to technology between Ohio's poor and rich school districts demonstrates the extent of deprivation that flows directly from the State's flawed funding system. While pupils in wealthy school districts use state of the art computers to access worldwide information services, pupils in the Plaintiff school districts are limited to antiquated computers, disk drives corrupted by the coal dust in the air, lack of replacement parts, no funds for repairs and one box of paper per year. (Tr. at 753-56; Jackson Depo. at 22; Findings at 275, 277 and 278) At the same time, the State acknowledges that the newly-mandated model math curricula will require access to more technology than is presently available. When queried about what school districts are expected to do if no funds are available to provide that technology it tells them: "Whatever technology is needed to implement the approved program must become a priority." (Pl. Exh. 55, p. 2; Supp. IX, Tab J)
32. (Findings at 290-297) Examples of the Plaintiff Dawson-Bryant School District's lack of compliance with the 1983 minimum standards include: intervention is not provided according to pupil needs; Ohio Studies is not offered to students; art instruction is not provided for 7th or 8th grade students; required science laboratory courses are not provided for students at the high school level; two staff members do not have certification for the subject area they are teaching; there is no professional library for staff; instructional materials and equipment are not current; some examples of out-of-date textbooks include: World Geography, 1980, World History, 1980; Economics, 1978; libraries are not available throughout the school day; in FY93, the district did not spend one-half of one percent of its budget on libraries; no library purchases were budgeted in FY94; district libraries do not have facilities to accommodate the enrollment and education goals of the school; none of the buildings meet the requirement that school buildings have first-aid facilities and space for placement or isolation of ill students; school guidance services are not provided for pupils in K-12 grade in accordance with the boards' written guidance plan; and physical education programs cannot be provided at the elementary levels because the district does not have the facilities. (Tr. 2376, 2400-2420; see also Supp. 1198-1217)
33. At the time the State enacted Revised Code Chapter 3323 (Special Education) the federal government was authorized to provide 40% of the funds for the education of handicapped pupils, but in FY89 federal funding was at 5%. (Pl. Exh. 235; Findings at 323) Since 1976, the burden of funding special education programs and services has been increasingly cast upon the State which has, in turn, required the school districts to make up the difference between the actual cost of the program and the combined State and dwindling federal funds provided.
34. Examples include pre-school services for handicapped pupils ages 3-5 (required as of July 1991), extended school year services, residential placements, assistive technology, transition services, and the addition of new types of handicapping conditions. (Findings at 330-333)
35. The Trial Court described the operation of the State's unit funding system. (Findings at 324-28) Although the State Board of Education has recommended equalization of unit funding, the method of calculation is the same for all districts regardless of district wealth. (Tr. 5565; Stip. 58) The unit funding formula includes teacher compensation based on the state minimum teacher's salary schedule, which the Legislature has not increased since July 1991. (R.C. 3307.53; Tr. 5564; Findings at 324)
36. Many handicapped children who were served in MRDD programs have moved into public school programs. Most of these children are multi-handicapped, have severe needs, and are more costly. (Herner Depo. 98-99; Tr. 5530; Findings at 327) If a child's needs are so severe that residential placement is required, no state funding is available. (Herner Depo. 130; Findings at 332) Plaintiff Dawson-Bryant Schools was billed over $15,000 for one student in FY90. (Pl. Exh. 258; Findings at 343)
37. Although the state provides basic aid, those funds do not begin to cover the cost of regular education, much less special education. Plaintiff Youngstown has been required to hire 55 educational assistants with no direct state reimbursement at a cost of $1 million per year and to purchase equipment such as computers, visual techs for visually impaired students at $3,000 each and touch talkers at $5,000 each. (McGee Depo. 34; 59-60; Findings at 359-60) Plaintiff Northern Local incurs excess costs of over $20,000 per year for two hearing impaired students and spent $20,000 defending a special education due process hearing. (Tr. 1462-64; Findings at 351)
38. Stip. Exh. 36 describes the widening gap between funds requested and those appropriated, which for FY93 was over $30 million.
39. (Tr. 2433-35; McGee Depo. 43-47; 93-94; K. Blankenship Depo. 12-20; Findings at 342-63)
40. The extent of educational need increases with the concentration of poverty. Above the 20 percent poverty rate, educational needs increase on a non-linear basis--that is, at a faster rate than additional increases in the poverty level. (Tr. 357-8; Findings at 384)
41. The school foundation program measures poverty in numbers of ADC pupils. R.C. § 3317.023.
42. (Stip. Exh. 2) In FY93, 9 of 19 elementary buildings in Plaintiff Youngstown City Schools had 90% of students eligible for free and reduced-price lunches. (Tr. 3212-15; Findings at 386)
43. Because of the conditions of poverty, inner city schools incur burdensome expenses that suburban schools do not. Plaintiff Youngstown Schools must expend funds for security systems in every school building because of equipment lost to theft, for weapons search machines, and for security patrol for schools. (Tr. 3271-74; Findings at 391) Similarly, rural school districts embrace additional costs because of poverty and must also spend increasing amounts to transport students to school. From 1973 to 1991 the percentage of transportation costs reimbursed by the State decreased from 62.75 percent to 36.91 percent. (Supp. 1446; Findings at 393-94) These sums would otherwise be spent on educational programs.
44. In Youngstown, for example, some children are in four different schools in one year and in some cases every child in a classroom changes completely--starting out with 25 pupils, and at the end of the year having 25 different pupils. (Tr. 3239; Supp. 1426) Problems such as high student mobility rates require additional guidance services and small class sizes to enhance self-esteem and to create and maintain a positive attitude toward learning. (Tr. 3227)
45. This incidence of student pregnancy has moved into grade levels as low as 6th grade in the Plaintiff Youngstown Schools. (Tr. 3246) As Dr. Carol Marino testified, "it is important for [teenage males] to go around and brag about the number of babies that they have produced. There should be significant work done with those young men *** but we don't have the money to do it." (Tr. 3275; Supp. 1435)
46. One Youngstown school playground "[d]oubles as a parking lot for staff and a shooting gallery for the neighborhood." (Hiscox Depo. at 132; Findings at 195) Because of a shooting, fights, and a student who was killed, and because the stadiums are in ill-repair, Plaintiff Youngstown City Schools' high school football games are played at Youngstown State University during daylight. (Tr. 3305; Supp. 1436)
<47. Many of the students of Youngstown City Schools come from single-parent families. There is much mobility of students throughout the district, and many students live in low-income housing or federal housing projects. The projects are very dangerous places to live. There is much drug trafficking, weapons, and killing in the projects, and anyone who can get out does. (Tr. 3212-15; Findings at 390)
48. Currently, only about 20% go on to four-year colleges and 15% to two-year colleges. The percentage of college attendance has decreased over time. (Tr. 2875; see also Supp. 1301-1312 and tab XI. Educational Outputs; Findings at 310-11)
49. (Findings at 374-77; 248-52; 290-97 and citations to record therein; Supp. 1424-1427)
50. (Tr. 2395; 440; 3218; Supp. 1423-24) Kindergarten screening at Plaintiff Dawson-Bryant Local Schools from 1989 to 1993 showed that students entering kindergarten have been less well prepared developmentally each year. (Tr. 2389-95; Pl. Exh. 271; Findings at 375)
51. (See Tr. 3248; Pl. Exh. 50) These guidelines are generally referred to as "Chapter 1" guidelines and are a part of the federal law now known as "Improving America's Schools Act," reauthorization of Elementary and Secondary Schools Act of 1964, 20 U.S.C. 6301. A student may be eligible for service in more than one subject area.
52. (Pl. Exh. 50) 92% of identified elementary student needs at Plaintiff Northern Local are not served, while that percentage is 65 for Plaintiff Lima City Schools, 74 for Plaintiff Youngstown Schools, and 81 for Plaintiffs Dawson-Bryant and Southern Local Schools.
53. (Findings at 227-242 and citations to record therein) State-mandated model curricula include composition, mathematics, science, citizenship and reading. R.C. 3301.0716. Seven program areas will have state curricula. (Findings at 227) Model curriculum requirements are imposed at each grade level K to 12. Districts may do more but may not do less than the state models. (Tr. 1905-06; Goff Depo. 79; Findings at 229)
54. (Tr. 1960, 5096; Findings at 231-32) Yet, no specific state funds are available for implementation of State-mandated model curricula. (Tr. 1247; Findings at 232)
55. (Pl. Exh. 36, "The Ninth Grade Proficiency Test: Is It Fair and Appropriate Measure of A Statewide Standard?" Legislative Office of Education Oversight, July, 1993, p. 26)
56. 65% of Plaintiff Youngstown City Schools' pupils are minorities. (Pl. Exh. 287)
57. Ted Sanders, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, has stated that some public school students were "making do in a decayed carcass from an era long passed," and others were educated in "dirty and depressing places." He further commented that the State of Ohio is not doing enough to meet the facilities needs of public schools. (Pl. Exh. 32, p. 5)
58. The Trial Court devoted 55 pages of its Findings of Fact to the deplorable state of Plaintiffs' facilities, as well as many other school districts in Ohio, and the State's utter failure to respond to the demonstrated facilities needs of Plaintiffs and other poor schools. (Findings at 148-203)
59. (Pl. Exh. 14; Supp. 741-800; see also Supp. tab VIII. Facilities)
60. According to the State Board of Education's Building Assistance Supervisor and Supervisor of School Facilities, the 1990 Facilities Survey was very professionally accomplished, was well done, and the costs to bring school buildings up to minimum standards was very realistic. (Franklin Depo. 220, 228-229, 236-237; Hunter Depo. 65-66; Findings at 159-61) Pl. Exh. 451 is a video produced by the State Department of Education documenting the results of the 1990 Facilities Survey.
61. Appropriations by the General Assembly for loans for school construction under the Classroom Facilities Act, R.C. Chapter 3318, have decreased from $25 million for years 1990 and 1991, to $10 million in 1992. The State has approved applications for school construction for 27 school districts in which students have been determined by the State to be "improperly housed"; however, it will be at least 7 to 9 years before those districts' buildings will be constructed, assuming the General Assembly will continue to appropriate moneys for the Classroom Facilities Act at the present rate. Although Plaintiff Northern Local has applied for building assistance funds, it is not on the approved list but rather is on a waiting list of school districts that have also sought building assistance. (Franklin Depo. 54; Tr. 1141-42; Findings at 153, 178)
62. The Facilities Study concluded that the cost of asbestos abatement in Plaintiff and other districts is $328 million, and the cost of compliance with the handicapped accessibility, but not all requirements of the ADA (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) is $153 million. (Pl. Exh. 14; Stip. 137; Franklin Depo. 203-04; Hunter Depo. 166; Findings at 161, 164)
63. Whereas the General Assembly appropriated $18 million for asbestos abatement for public schools in 1990, and $6 million in 1991, no funds have been appropriated since 1991. Similarly, whereas $3.38 million was appropriated in 1990 and 1991 for architectural barrier abatement (handicap accessibility), no further funds have been made available by the State to school districts for ADA compliance. (Franklin Depo. 171-173, 182; Hunter Depo. 53-54, 81; Stip. 139; Findings at 162, 165-166)
64. Robert Franklin, State Building Assistance Supervisor testified: "I told them, I said, the bricks are going to come down, I don't know when, though, but it's not safe. And my recommendation was to get those kids out of the school." (Franklin Depo. 131; Supp. 956)
65. (Findings at 175-183; 197-200 and citations to record therein).
66. 1990 Ohio Public School Facilities Survey (Pl. Exh. 14, p. 3; Supp. 747)
I saw children that were basically healthy, well groomed.... [T]hey
came to school, I think, with dignity and self-respect .... In
the classrooms, the materials are old and worn out and dated,
and the laboratory material, the materials are not there for the
children or the teachers. The special education classes were in
cubbyholes that don't meet my standards, and I think they're a
disgrace to the State of Ohio and probably to all of us in America
that you'd have special education children in this day and time
in those types of classrooms.
V. State mandated school district
borrowing
"The issue is the world and the country has changed much
more dramatically than schools have changed. And, therefore, what
was good enough 30 years ago is not even close to being good enough
now, but we haven't changed the system in public schools to make
it much different than it was 30 years ago."
A. Walter does not determine the constitutionality of the current funding system.
1. The current funding system differs significantly from that
challenged in Walter, and the nature of the challenges
is distinct.
2. The needs of Ohio's children and the significance of education
are far greater today than they were at the time of Walter.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to
1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896
when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.***
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education.
Everyday education becomes more and more important and the connection
between education and the rights guaranteed by Art. I § 1
becomes greater and greater. Today we live in a high tech world. A world that is becoming more technologically advanced at a rapid pace. The measure of education never has been
viewed as a static measure.
B. Walter cannot be construed to approve the current system of funding public education, and stare decisis does
not require adherence to its archaic analysis.
A judge looking at a constitutional decision may have strong feelings
to revere the past and accept what was once written. *** "
***Should we, for whatever reason, be denied the right to reexamine
constitutional precedent which, after all, is a personal matter
for each judge who assumes these responsibilities? If the answer
to these questions is "yes," would we not then be letting
persons, who may be long dead and gone and unaware of the problems
of our age, do our thinking for us? Can we afford to live with
such hidebound, slavish adherence to the past when, in fact, we
live in an ever-evolving society that requires innovative thinking
and even change to cope with problems of the present and future?
Just to ask these questions answers them.A. The Ohio Constitution assigns to the General Assembly the responsibility for the creation and funding of a system of
common schools, and that body cannot divest itself of ultimate
responsibility for that system.
"[T]he General Assembly, not the local school district, bears
full responsibility for providing an education system."
The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation,
or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust
fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system
of common schools throughout the state.
The Ohio Constitution clearly places the responsibility for public
education upon the State of Ohio. Because local school boards
initiate school levies for local voters' consideration, expend
funds locally, and generally exercise administrative control over
local schools, many people may well believe that such local boards
of education have primary responsibility for the maintenance and
operation of the public schools in Ohio. In fact, the state remains
primarily responsible. This mandate has been our law since the
adoption of the 1851 Ohio Constitution
B. The system of public schools produced by the challenged funding system is neither thorough nor efficient.
In that the State is bound to provide a thorough and efficient
education it is helpful to note how the delegates to the 1851
Constitutional Convention defined these terms. Statements made
by delegates show that "thorough" was intended to mean
"complete, absolute and exact" while "efficient"
was intended to mean "effective and working well."
"A practical test for 'thorough and efficient system of common
schools' is the question, 'Would I, as a parent, be willing to
have my children educated in any of the 612 school districts in
Ohio?' If the answer is 'no,' the system would appear to be suspect."
Restructuring the Common School in Ohio: The Path to Educational
Progress, Policy and Budget Recommendations of the State Board
of Education to the Governor and 119th General Assembly, Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 140 at 2.
[A] thorough system cannot mean one in which part or any number
of the school districts of the state were starved for funds. An
efficient system cannot be one in which part or any number of
the school districts of the state lacked teachers, buildings or
equipment.
C. The system of schools produced by the challenged funding system violates the liberty and property interests of students,
and neglects the heightened statutory entitlements of handicapped
students
[O]nce a state establishes a system of education and requires
school attendance, an "understanding" is created between
the state and the student "that secures certain benefits
and that supports claims of entitlement to those benefits."
a. all handicapped children entitled to receive special education
are provided with an appropriate public education, and
A. Public education is a fundamental
right of unique societal and individual importance, expressly
protected by the Ohio Constitution.
1. Historical background[118]
*** Conservatives saw the common schools as a civilizing influence,
and liberals viewed them as the way for the poor to climb the
ladder of society. By 1851 the objectives of the Common School
movement had wide support in Ohio, leading to the inclusion of
Article VI in the 1851 Constitution.[124] 2. Contemporary importance
[T]he sovereign people have not considered the giving of education
to be a private purpose. The existence of an intelligent and enlightened
people is the basis of national prosperity and political integrity,
and the system by which we endeavor to educate and enlighten the
coming generations is rightly made by law a matter of supreme
public concern.
B. The disparities in educational opportunity that result from Ohio's school funding system do not serve any compelling
state interest and are not rationally related to any legitimate
state objective, including the asserted interest in furthering
local control of the schools, and accordingly violate the Ohio
Constitution.
In the attainment of the purpose of establishing an efficient
and thorough system of schools throughout the state it was easily
conceivable that the greatest expense might arise in the poorest
districts; that portions of great cities, teeming with life, would
be able to contribute relatively little in taxes for the support
of schools, which are the main hope for enlightening these districts.
Could there be a more reasonable classification than that provided
for in this act--that school districts should receive aid in varying
proportions according to their needs; that city and exempted village
school districts, which experience has shown are crippled for
lack of school funds, should be preferred; and that all other
school districts should then share in the balance of the fund
***?
Plaintiff Northern Local School District has primarily engaged
in 'crisis management' during the 1990's and has been forced to
forego building repairs, textbook renewal, advanced placement
options and full handicapped access. (Pl. Exh. 129) Plaintiff
Lima City Schools has spent over $10 million dollars since 1980
to comply with unfunded state mandates and has been unable to
purchase necessary educational equipment and supplies, expand
elementary guidance services or offer allday everyday
kindergarten. (Pl. Exh. 284) Plaintiff DawsonBryant School
District has been unable to implement advanced placement courses,
allday everyday kindergarten, textbook replacement
and full handicapped access to its building. (Pl. Exh. 276) Plaintiff
Southern Local School District is simply reacting to state mandated
regulations and deciding what programs and services to cut. They
further have been unable to implement any textbook replacement
schedule, advanced placement courses or cultural enrichment programs
for their students. (Pl. Exh. 89) Plaintiff Youngstown City School
District no longer makes proactive decisions about what programs
to add and policies to implement based upon the best interest
of the students. Instead, due to such mandated programs as EMIS,
model curricula and proficiency testing the boards' decisions
mainly regard the cutting of programs. (Taylor Depo. 150151;
Goff Depo. 116, Kolitsos Depo. 76).
Due to the Plaintiff school districts being some of the poorestin the State this is not a viable option. The fact that school
districts have the "ability" to determine how dollars
are spent in some circumstances is a hollow argument when there
are not sufficient funds to provide for the educational and facility
needs of their particular school district. It should further be
noted that some of the Plaintiffs in this action are minors. The
State has an obligation to provide them with a thorough and efficient
education. The vast majority of students in this State who have
not reached the voting age are completely disenfranchised and
have no ability to raise additional funds nor decide how to expend
funds received by their school districts. *** As the Plaintiffs
have argued in this case local control without discretionary funds
is a myth and does not justify the vast disparities in educational
funding and educational opportunity throughout this State.
Civ.R. 8(A) requires only
that a pleading contain a short and plain statement of the circumstances
entitling the party to relief. A party is not required to plead
the legal theory of recovery or the consequences which naturally
flow by operation of law from the legal relationship of the parties.
[T]he court, in an opinion by Judge Swan, held that present obligations
to pay money at a future time, without revenue and appropriations
provided therefor, are debts of the state in contravention of
Sections 1 and 3 of Article VIII of the Ohio Constitution.
A. It is the role of the judiciary to declare the unconstitutionality of the current system of public school funding; it is then the
obligation of the legislature to devise a system that comports
with the mandates of the Ohio Constitution.
The struggle for legislative supremacy over constitutional limitations
should have ended a century ago. Formerly, there was openly asserted
a doctrine *** [t]hat constitutional limitations upon the exercise
of legislative power are but admonitions to the legislative department,
without efficacy to annul enactments inconsistent with them. In
1803 that doctrine was completely overthrown by an authority which
no one has challenged from that day to this, and upon reasoning
so conclusive that it has evoked the universal approval and admiration
of generations of students of constitutional law.
Those who are charged with the exercise of judicial power in a
constitutional government cannot too often advert to Marbury v.
Madison[.]*** [W]ith respect to the adjudication of questions
of this character, that which is sometimes urged and regarded
as mere compromise or concession is in fact a dereliction of duty.
Since the soundness of that doctrine is universally admitted,
its effect should not be evaded.
Where a constitution or city charter imposes a mandatory duty
upon a legislative body to enact legislation to give life to a
particular provision of such constitution or charter, a court
may compel the legislative body to act, but it can not direct
the course of action.
B. Continuing judicial oversight is appropriate in order to facilitate the timely creation and implementation of a constitutional
system for funding public education in Ohio
Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility
in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling
public and private needs. *** While giving weight to these public
and private considerations, the courts will require that the defendants
make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance. ***
They also will consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants
may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition
to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. During this period
of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases.
C. Having declared that the State wrongfully violated multiple provisions of the Ohio Constitution, as a consequence of which
countless students throughout the state have been deprived of
their constitutional right to an adequate and equitable education,
the Trial Court properly awarded attorney fees and such award
did not represent an abuse of diiscretion.
Nowhere in R.C. Chapter 2721 is there any provision which narrows
the broad authority conferred by R.C. 2721.09. Moreover, R.C.
2721.09 does not place any legal significance
on the insurer's conduct nor is the operation of the section conditioned
on which party actually prevails in the underlying action. Rather,
the only limitation placed on the trial court is that the relief
must be "necessary or proper."
/s/ Nicholas A. Pittner (0023159)
John F. Birath, Jr. (0022024)
Sue W. Yount (0034514)
Michael D. Smith (0059870)
Susan B. Greenberger (0010154)
BRICKER & ECKLER LLP
100 South Third Street
Columbus, Ohio 43215
(614) 227-2300
Lawrence A. Kane, Jr. Betty D. Montgomery
Mark A. Vander Laan Jeffrey S. Sutton
Joel S. Taylor OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
David K. Mullen GENERAL, STATE OF OHIO
William M. Mattes 30 East Broad Street, 15th Floor
DINSMORE & SHOHL Columbus, Ohio 43215-3428
175 S. Third Street, Suite 1000
Columbus, Ohio 43215
Robert B. McAlister
Elizabeth A. McNellie
BAKER & HOSTETLER
65 East State Street, Suite 2100
Columbus, Ohio 43215
________________________________
/s/Nicholas A. Pittner (0023159)
Weakness 2--Categorical program allocations are not equalized. Districts get the same allocation for the same number of units regardless of local property wealth. The rationale is that if we equalize basic aid, why shouldn't we equalize categorical aid also. [Discussed below.]
Weakness 3--The guarantees diminish the equalization effects of the formula by giving more basic aid to districts than they would get with the formula calculation. [Note: The guarantee has primarily benefited the high wealth districts. (Payton Depo. 156; Russell Depo. 118) In FY92, 360 of the state's 611 school districts received funding based on a guarantee provision rather than the State's formula, showing that the formula is not working. (Stip. Exh. 13; Supp. 87)]
Weakness 4--Present charge-off does not accurately measure the ability of districts to pay the local share of the basic program.
Weakness 5--Only small effort is given to the funding of capital improvements from the state level.
B. Weakness in Local Property Tax Law
Weakness 1--Application of tax reduction factors pursuant to Section 319.301 of the Ohio Revised Code, limits growth in local property tax revenues to inside millage, new construction, and increased value of tangible personal property. This forces many school districts to have to repeatedly go to the voters to approve levies to keep pace with inflation. [Discussed above.] (Pl. Exh. 140, p.19; Supp. 301)