March 24, 2010
Ohio Supreme Court Upholds Constitutionality of Employer Intentional Tort Statute
Full text of the Kaminski opinion
Full text of the Stetter opinion
On March 23, 2010, in two separate cases, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a 2005 state law that
limits the ability of employees injured on the job to sue their employers for damages in addition to receiving workers' compensation benefits. The statute at issue, R.C. 2745.01, is the General Assembly's most recent attempt at limiting intentional tort lawsuits against employers. Previous employer intentional tort statutes have not passed constitutional muster. Today's decisions are good news to employers who often find themselves defending intentional tort lawsuits at the same time as they are paying workers' compensation benefits to the plaintiff-employee.
The statute provides that in an action claiming a workplace intentional tort "the employer shall not be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer committed the tortious act with the intent to injure another or with the belief that the injury was substantially certain to occur." And, "substantially certain" means "that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or death." R.C. 2745.01(B) (emphasis added). The statute amended the definition of "intentional tort" set forth at Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 115, which provided for certain employer conduct to be deemed "substantially certain" to occur, and thus "intentional," even if the employer did not act with a "deliberate intent" to harm the employee.
In the first case, Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., Slip Op. No. 2010-Ohio-1027, the Court held that R.C. 2745.01 does not violate Section 34 or 35 of Article II of the Ohio Constitution. Generally, Section 34 authorizes the General Assembly to enact laws "fixing and regulating the hours of labor, establishing a minimum wage, and providing for the comfort, health, safety and general welfare of all employees" and Section 35 authorizes the General Assembly to establish Ohio's workers compensation fund for employees injured on the job. Section 35 specifically provides that "such [workers'] compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to compensation, or damages . . . and any employer who pays the premium or compensation provided by law . . . shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for such death, injuries or occupational disease." The Court held, consistent with its previous recent decisions, that these constitutional provisions grant broad authority to the General Assembly rather than limit its power to enact legislation.
The Court went on to address its decision in Johnson v. BP Chems., Inc. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 298, which struck down a former version of the intentional tort statute as unconstitutional. The Kaminski Court stated that the current version of R.C. 2745.01 "differs considerably from the former version of R.C. 2745.01 at issue in Johnson." As a result, the Court was not required to overrule Johnson. The Court noted that "this approach is consistent with Arbino and Groch, which did not overrule previous decisions in similar situations." Id. at sect; 97.
Justice Cupp authored the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Moyer and Justices Lundberg Stratton and O'Donnell concurring in the opinion. Justice O'Connor concurred in judgment only. Justice Lanzinger concurred in part, disagreeing with the Court's decision to limit the holding in Johnson rather than overruling that decision. Justice Pfeifer dissented, finding R.C. 2745.01 to be an unconstitutional abrogation of the definition of "intentional tort" set forth in Fyffe v. Jeno's, Inc., (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 115.
In the second case, Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C., Slip Op. No. 2010-Ohio-1029,
the Court held that the employer intentional tort statute, R.C. 2745.01, is constitutional on its face and
does not violate the Ohio Constitution's trial-by-jury provision (Section 5, Article I), the right-to-a-remedy and
open-courts provisions (Section 16, Article I), the due-course-of-law provision (Section 16, Article I), the equal
protection provision (Section 2, Article I), or the separation-of-powers doctrine. The Court also held that, per its decision in Kaminski,
the statute does not conflict with the legislative authority granted to the General Assembly by Sections
34 and 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, and that the statute does not eliminate the common law cause of
action for an employer intentional tort (although the definition of "substantially certain" applicable to such
an action would be that contained in R.C. 2745.01 rather than Fyffe v. Jeno's). The Court stated that R.C. 2745.01 "embodies
the General Assembly's intent to significantly curtail an employee's access to common-law damages for what we will call a 'substantially certain' employer intentional tort."
Justice Cupp authored the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Moyer and Justices Lundberg Stratton, O'Donnell and Lanzinger concurring. Justice O'Connor concurred in the answers to the certified questions only. (This case answered questions certified by a federal court.) Justice Pfeifer dissented for the reasons set forth in his opinion in Kaminski, stating also that he believed R.C. 2745.01 to unconstitutionally restrict employees' rights to a remedy and open courts.